Coursera courses blocked in Cuba (by the US!)

I just got an email from reader and contributor Doug Madory with the subject "Coursera blocked in Cuba."

My first reaction was anger that the Cuban government would block educational material -- maybe they were trying to censor something from a Latin American history class?

But, following the link Doug sent, I discovered that Coursera has been blocked by the U. S. because they were violating export control regulations prohibiting U.S. businesses from offering services to users in sanctioned countries, including Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. 

I try to keep my political opinions off this blog, but that is brain damaged.

Coursera says they are "working very closely with the U.S. Department of State and Office of Foreign Assets Control to secure permissions to reinstate site access for students in sanctioned countries."

I realize that few people in Cuba can access Coursera classes, but even as a largely symbolic gesture, that is a no-brainer.

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Update 2/5/2014

I have followed up on this story in an attempt to determine whether the U. S. Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) ordered Coursera to block access to Cuba (and other nations -- Iran. North Korea, Libya and Sudan) or the company blocked access unilaterally in order to avoid possible problems.

Reader Alam Brito pointed out that the Google Code and SourceForge sites were also blocked. (Follow the links in the previous sentence to see their statements on the issue).

I've attempted to contact each of these companies to learn whether the government ordered them to block Cuba and the others. Here is what I have learned so far:

• Coursera says they were told to block their site by both OFAC and the State Department.
• SourceForge had promised to get back to me.
• Google has not answered emails or phone calls.

I also contacted OFAC.  They said they could not comment on specific cases, but sent a copy of the following policy statement:

• OFAC administers various sanctions programs, including programs that generally prohibit the exportation and re-exportation of goods, services, and technology by U.S. persons and entities to persons located in or ordinarily resident in Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba.
• For the purpose of these sanctions programs, the prohibition on exportation of services by U.S. persons would apply to the provision of online courses and issuance of certificates of mastery upon completion of an online course to persons located in or ordinarily resident in sanctioned countries, unless specifically or generally licensed.
• While we will not comment on specific licenses, generally speaking, OFAC has a long history of licensing U.S. academic and educational institutions to engage in exchange programs in third countries as well as to provide certain in-country and online academic and educational training programs in the past.
• Some programs, such as the Syria sanctions, contain a general license by which U.S. persons and entities are generally authorized to export educational services to persons located in Syria without the need for a specific license from OFAC.
• Where not authorized by a general license or subject to a specific licensing policy set forth in our regulations, OFAC has a favorable licensing policy to authorize U.S. persons to engage in certain targeted educational, cultural and sports exchange programs, as well as research and humanitarian projects that are designed to benefit people in sanctioned countries. Of course, under a favorable licensing policy, U.S. persons need to come in and seek a license - without that, we cannot act.
• OFAC, in consultation with the State Department will continue to consider requests by U.S. persons to engage in activities to provide online courses and certificates of mastery to persons located in or ordinarily resident in sanctioned countries.

The fifth bullet point sounds rather positive, but Coursera's optional fee for a certificate of completion might be a sticking point.

OFAC also suggested that I contact edX, which, like Coursera, provides online classes. An edX spokesman said they had never blocked their site, but had requested an OFAC license to allow access in the embargoed nations. The application process took seven months, but the license was granted and they remained open.

So far, it sounds like OFAC is open, but wants to consider each case separately, so requires a license application. I may be wrong, and will hopefully hear more from the blocked companies.

While edX succeeded in obtaining a license, the delay and effort seem inappropriate and the policy is vague enough to discourage potential service providers -- self-censorship by confusion. OFAC should streamline the license application process, but, more important, should clarify their regulations so companies like edX and Coursera could avoid the process entirely.

Stay tuned for feedback from the other companies.

ETECSA plans to offer Mobile Internet access and email

A brief post on CubaDebate says ETECSA will be offering mobile Internet access this summer.

But, there are no details. Where will the new service be available? What will it cost? What technology will it use?

ETECA attributes this modernization and extension of service to increased foreign exchange.  (They also reduced calling and texting rates recently -- I assume that is payments for service, not investment).

Does anyone know more about this planned offering?

The Hackathon for Cuba -- in Miami, not Havana

There will be a two day Hackathon for Cuba in Miami starting with a reception the evening of January 31 and getting down to work on February first. (The event is organized by the Miami Beach-based nonprofit Roots of Hope and with funding from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation and they hope to repeat it in New York and San Francisco.)

The Hackathon goal is to develop prototype programs that are well suited to Cuba -- software for a nation with slow, expensive wire-line connectivity and second generation cell phone infrastructure.

For example, there are smart phones in Cuba. They cannot be used for modern Internet access, but they can be used as stand-alone computers, perhaps connected to external peripherals. The Hackathon might produce some innovative stand alone applications for smartphones.

We might also see applications tailored to Cuba'a slow, $5 per hour Internet connectivity -- for example, programs to facilitate creating and replying to email or other messages offline and uploading and downloading them in compressed batches.

Regardless, since necessity is the mother of invention, we can hope for innovations that would be useful in Cuba or any other nation with poor Internet infrastructure. We might even see some novel solutions for busy executives travelling in "airplane mode."

I have argued in other posts, for example here and here, that the Cuban government's limited access policy is causing missed opportunities. (Cuban leaders understood this cost long ago).

The Hackathon for Cuba is a good thing, but I wish it were in Havana rather than Miami.
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Update 1/31/2014

The Washington Post has an article on the Hackathon.

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Update 2/4/2014

You can read the Hackathon coverage by the Miami Herald and WLRN TV.

The ground rules were that all entries had to be legal in both the US and Cuba, which led to the disqualification of a satellite-based entry.

The winners were email-based systems to use Twitter and to retrieve material from Wikipedia and the Web and a WiFi access point built around a Raspberry Pi.

Those email-based systems are a throwback to the earliest days of the Internet. One of the oldest, continuously operated email retrieval services is Bit-l, which has been run by Ing. Jorge Espresate X. at Infomed in Cuba for many years.

The good news from the Hackathon is that it has produced some interesting ideas. The bad news is that they are for tecnology that is obsolete in most of the world -- another indication of the price Cuba has paid for its antiquated Internet.

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Update 2/8/2014

Christina, from Choose Digital, participated in the Hackathon and gives her impression and describes her app in this blog post.

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Update 4/7/2015

The next Roots of Hope hackathon for Cuba will be held at Facebook headquarters April 25 and 26th. Submissions may be hardware or software applications that can be launched in Cuba to facilitate (1) connectivity/access to information, (2) entrepreneurship and (3) journalism and digital advocacy. There will be $7,000 in prize money.

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Update 5/13/2015

Roots of Hope has begun Startups Cuba to assist and encourage Cuban entrepreneurs

StartUp Cuba, an initiative of Roots of Hope, seeks to empower entrepreneurs in Cuba by providing them with access to educational resources and mentorship as they launch and grow their businesses. We provide workshops and seminars for early stage entrepreneurs, as well as fellowships outside of Cuba for experienced business owners.

They hope to award fellowships to and hold workshops for Cuban entrepreneurs, but, judging from their Web site, they are just starting up.

Yoani Sánchez lists the ten most popular Android apps in Cuba

Cubans can't use their smartphones as high-speed Internet access devices, but they are using them as small computers -- accessing local databases, running office-like apps, editing photos, etc.

Yoani Sánchez has compliled a list ot the ten most popular Android apps in Cuba.

In a couple of years, we may all be docking our smartphones and using them as desktop computers when we are at home or work. Necessity is the mother of invention -- might we use Cuban apps when that time comes? What sort of apps will be be able to run on a fast 64-bit "phone" with 8GB or more memory?

Un método Cubano para lograr conectividad a internet

(Versión Inglés)

La infraestructura doméstica de conexión a internet en Cuba es una de las peores del mundo, y sus posibilidades de mejoría son ínfimas a causa del embargo de E.U, las políticas de control de acceso y de limitaciones al acceso, el poder de ETECSA, la falta de una base de técnicos y usuarios entrenados y en alta demanda, y la falta de capital. ¿Podría eliminarse de alguna manera estos obstáculos?

El embargo va a ser derogado eventualmente, y hay signos de que podría ser relativamente pronto. Mientras tanto, China y otros países están dispuestos a vender y negociar con Cuba.

Las políticas de control gubernamentales podrían cambiar. Cuando Cuba se unió a internet por primera vez, hubo un debate de alto nivel sobre “el dilema del dictador” - la percepción de internet como una amenaza política y cultural contra su potencial de mejorar la vida de las personas y la economía. Se tomó entonces la decisión de controlar internet y el acceso al mismo - pero esta situación no está tallada en piedra, podría revertirse.

¿Y sobre ETECSA? ¿Existe acaso alguna nación en la que el proveedor de telecomunicaciones (sea propiedad del gobierno o privado) no actúe en interés propio a detrimento de la población y la economía? Sospecho que la respuesta es “no”. No conozco a la administración actual de ETECSA, pero me sorprendería que fuera diferente al resto.

ETECSA pertenece conjuntamente al Ministerio de Informática y Comunicaciones y a la empresa RAFIN, SA. El Ministerio lógicamente es parte del gobierno y se somete a su voluntad política -pero las políticas y los líderes pueden cambiar-.

RAFIN es un asunto diferente. No sé cuál es su rol en la administración de ETECSA. Ni siquiera comprendo el rol de una S.A en una nación socialista. ¿Dónde obtuvieron el capital para comprar la parte de ETECSA que pertenecía a Telecom Italia? ¿Quiénes son los accionistas e inversores? ¿Comparten ellos las ganancias y pérdidas de ETECSA? ¿Obtienen un puesto en el consejo de administración -una voz en las decisiones ejecutivas y de políticas a aplicar-? Necesito ayuda de un economista en esta parte.

Una base de técnicos y usuarios entrenados llegará una vez que la conectividad sea útil, globalmente disponible, y abordable -llegara como consecuencia, no como requerimiento, para una internet moderna-.

Nos queda entonces la falta de capital. China jugó un papel activo en el financiamiento e instalación del cable submarino ALBA-1, y en ese entonces especulé que a lo mejor harian una inversión en la infraestructura doméstica, pero esto hasta el momento no ha sucedido.

La sabiduría convencional del Banco Mundial o de la Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones es que el camino para lograr el capital necesario para la conectividad es privatizar la industria de las telecomunicaciones y de los proveedores de servicios de internet (ISP), e invitar entonces a inversores extranjeros a construir la infraestructura y competir hasta cierto nivel mientras son controlados por una agencia reguladora – Privatización, Regulación y Competencia (PCR).

Raúl Castro anunció que el gobierno está trabajando en una nueva política de inversión extranjera, lo cual es de singular importancia para estimular el desarrollo económico y social del país. La ley se espera que esté aprobada en Marzo próximo. Falta ver si la nueva ley y la supuesta demanda atraerá o no a inversionistas mayores, pero incluso si sucediera, hay un problema con la estrategia PCR – no funciona bien.

Muchas naciones en desarrollo optaron por la estrategia PCR entre 1991 y 2008:

En el año 2009, observé los datos y concluí que "PCR tuvo un impacto pequeño sobre Internet durante los últimos diez años en naciones desarrolladas o en desarrollo." No he actualizado el artículo con datos consecutivos, pero nuestra experiencia en E.U muestra que la propiedad privada sobre los servicios de telecomunicaciones no garantiza la competencia, la eficiencia y el buen servicio, a pesar de las buenas intenciones de los reguladores y del congreso.

Necesitamos una solución Cubana.

Seria genial si Cuba pudiera permitirse comprar una infraestructura moderna de telecomunicaciones, con fibra óptica hasta las edificaciones y retroalimentación (backhaul) para comunicaciones móviles LTE (siglas en inglés para “evolución a largo plazo”), pero no puede, por lo que tenemos que pensar en soluciones a corto plazo más baratas. El resto de este artículo lo dedicaremos a especular sobre una posibilidad, una política descentralizada multi-satelital.

Varios años atrás, escribí dos artículos (aquí y aquí) abordando las tecnologías inalámbricas para la conectividad en países en desarrollo: plataformas enlazadas y no enlazadas de altitud elevada (HAPs), redes inalámbricas terrestres (WiMAX era esperanzadora en aquel entonces), constelaciones de satélites de órbita baja (LEO) y terminales de satélite de apertura muy pequeña (VSATs).

Google experimenta actualmente con HAPs, pero sin ninguna utilización significativa. Hasta donde conozco, nadie está estudiando los satélites LEO y WiMAX no se desarrolló como se había previsto. En la época en que se escribieron esos artículos, VSAT era la única opción para conectar áreas rurales en naciones como la India, pero las estaciones terrestres VSAT eran grandes, caras y lentas.

Desde aquel entonces, la tecnología ha progresado, y el mercado de consumidores para la conexión por satélite ha crecido. Proveedores estadounidenses como HughesNet y Viasat tienen 1 398 000 suscriptores entre los dos. A pesar de los largos tiempos de respuesta, he tenido video-conferencias fluidas con amigos que usan platos satelitales en zonas rurales de Brasil y Chile. Las antenas son pequeñas, los costos bajan, y la velocidad crece.

¿Qué pasaría si el gobierno cubano fomentara el uso de los satélites en lugar de prohibirlos?

El gobierno de Cuba ha dicho que autorizará agentes para la venta de tiempo de teléfono e internet. ¿Que pasaria si expandieran el programa para permitir a esos agentes a poseer y vender tiempo y servicios usando enlaces de internet por satélite –- de la misma forma que las “damas de teléfonos Grameen” en Bangladesh compraban teléfonos celulares para revender el tiempo de llamada?

Hoy, hay algunos puntos de satélite instalados ilegalmente en Cuba. Imaginemos 1000 platos de satélite legales, dispersos por toda la isla, suministrando acceso a internet y a llamadas VOIP (las cuales son ilegales hoy).

Si esta idea se tomara en consideración, imagino que ETECSA querría poseer las estaciones terrestres y establecer los precios. Eso garantizaría las ganancias y el control gubernamental sobre el acceso a Internet, pero sería una estrategia de corta visión. Permitir a los operadores de satélites ser propietarios de su equipamiento, crearía un grupo descentralizado, auto-controlado, de empresarios que aportarían esfuerzo e innovaciones al proyecto.

La situación en Cuba hoy es un recuerdo de lo que era Internet al final de los años 1980 en E.U. Se inventó TCP/IP y mostraba ser efectivo en las redes APRANet y CSNET. El potencial de la red era obvio para aquellos que la habían utilizado, pero el acceso estaba restringido a unas pocas organizaciones y personas.

En aras de conectar a más personas, la Fundación Nacional de Ciencia (National Science Fundation) estableció NSFNet. Ellos contrataron una infraestructura de conexión nacional (blackbone network), y ofrecieron fondos a todos los colegas y universidades para cubrir los costos de un enrutador (router) y de la conexión a la infraestructura nacional. También ofrecieron conexión a redes de educación e investigación en países en desarrollo. Cuando fue desactivado en Abril de 1995, NSFNet era la infraestructura de conexión global, enlazando 28 470 redes domésticas y 22 296 foráneas. (Nótese que Spring, el proveedor de conectividad para naciones en desarrollo, también suministraba conectividad a Cuba, a pesar del embargo)

El proyecto NSFNet en su totalidad costó al contribuyente de E.U $94.5 millones – una inversión pequeña con un retorno inestimable. Cubrir a Cuba con una sábana da platos satelitales tendría resultados similares.

La inversión de NSFNet fue altamente balanceada. Mientras que las universidades obtenían conexión gratuita a la red nacional, se esperaba que ofrecieran acceso para las facultades y los estudiantes. Colectivamente, las universidades invirtieron mucho más en las redes locales de sus campus, en entrenamiento y en personal, que lo que invirtió NSF en NSFNet. El enfoque descentralizado y la arquitectura "end-end" de la red empujaron tanto la formación de capitales como innovaciones a el borde de la red donde hubieron inversionistas y empresarios listo para participar.

¿Cuál sería el rol del gobierno Cubano en un mundo de acceso satelital descentralizado? Su tarea más importante sería la planificación de la capacidad y la negociación con las compañías suministradoras de comunicación por satélite para el ancho de banda. Ellos tendrían además que especificar, evaluar y comprar equipamiento para estaciones terrestres (algunas de los cuales podrían fabricarse en la isla).

Ellos deberían también tomar la delantera en el desarrollo de software que opere eficientemente cuando no hay conexión, usando compresión automática de datos y trasfiriendo los mismos cuando el usuario se conecte. Este tipo de software sería útil en cualquier país con ancho de banda limitado, no solo en Cuba. Dado que la necesidad es la madre de la invención, podríamos incluso llegar a ver soluciones novedosas para ejecutivos ocupados viajando en “modo avión”.

El gobierno debería también apoyar a los operadores de satélite ofreciéndoles préstamos bancarios que ayuden con el costo inicial del equipamiento, facilitando entrenamiento y compartiendo experiencia y “mejores prácticas”. Uno puede imaginarse un banco de micro-finanzas controlado por el gobierno que ofrezca préstamos, y el gobierno pagando los costos de operación de una asociación de operadores de satélite. Como sucedió con NSFNet, el gobierno podría irse alejando de estas actividades una vez que la red sea estable y auto-sostenida.

Por supuesto el sistema de satélites es solo un paso intermedio, a largo plazo será desplazado en favor de una infraestructura de fibra óptica moderna. El sistema de satélites pavimentaría el camino hacia ese objetivo, al crear demanda y habilidades en los usuarios. Los enlaces de satélite servirían de guía al gobierno sobre como asignar sus escasos recursos de fibra óptica -regiones de alta demanda se conectarían primero que las demás-. (Google siguió una estrategia similar al priorizar barrios cuando instalaron su red Giga-bit en la ciudad de Kansas, - áreas con muchos suscriptores fueron las primeras en conectarse-).

Nótese que he sugerido que el gobierno sea responsable por la infraestructura de fibra óptica, pero no por proveer el servicio de internet. Deberían ver la infraestructura de conexión como si fueran carreteras – proveer una infraestructura para ser usada por tractores, autobuses y autos que tienen propietarios independientes. China siguió una estrategia de lanzamiento de internet similar, con organizaciones del gobierno construyendo las infraestructuras de red que para finales de 1999 estaban siendo usadas por más de 500 proveedores de servicio de internet.

Recordemos que las universidades de NSFNet aportaron sus propias redes locales. Uno puede entonces imaginarse redes locales a nivel de ciudad o de pueblos, enlazando estaciones terrestres en la ciudad. Como en el caso de NSF, el diseño y la inversión en tales redes deberían ser locales. En este caso, viene a mi recuerdo las redes de distribución de TV “hechas en casa”, en las que la gente usa su propio cable coaxial para conectar casas y otros locales a una estación central terrestre.

Al inicio de esta publicación, expuse una lista de barreras en el camino a la conectividad en Cuba. He presentado una propuesta de arrancada de bajo costo para una conectividad que no requiere inversión extranjera.

Esto deja entonces las barreras políticas. Tal vez hay esperanza. Como se menciona antes, E.U ha manifestado un deseo de cambio de política y Raúl Castro a llamado a los cubanos a adoptar las reformas económicas “sin prisa, pero sin pausa.”

Un estímulo más específico viene del primer Vice-Presidente Miguel Díaz-Canel, quien dijo: "Hoy, con el desarrollo de las tecnologías de la información, de las redes sociales, de la informática y la Internet, prohibir algo es casi una quimera imposible. No tiene sentido. (...) Por tanto, nosotros constantemente tenemos que estar dialogando."

Reconozco la ironía de proponer que el gobierno adopte una tecnología que llevó al encarcelamiento de Alan Gross y otros. Revertir la legislación sobre comunicación satelital requeriría coraje político, pero también brindaría al gobierno un argumento poderoso contra las acusaciones que pesan sobre él y estarían persiguiendo una solución cubana , una en la que Internet es operado como un servicio al pueblo y la sociedad, no al gobierno o a compañías de telecomunicaciones.

Traducción de un amigo de la Internet cubana.
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Actualización
1/10/2014

Una persona que respondió a mi post menciono que no es necesario que la política de los EE UU cambia para este propuesta tenga éxito. Afirma que en Abril 2009 el gobierno Americano aprobó la venta de satélites para servicios Internet.

Revise lo que la administración en "Reaching out to the Cuban People" especificaba y aprendí que autorizaba cable de fibra óptica y satélites de comunicación que conectaban Cuba con EE UU -- explícitamente para radio y televisión, pero no mencionaba la Internet.

Le pregunté al Departamento del Tesoro, si un proveedor de Internet por satélite podría obtener una licencia para servir a una cuenta de Cuba. Me contestaron que tendrían que revisar para darme una respuesta.
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Actualización
1/18/2014

Satélite ISP IPSTAR dice que han conectado más de 26.000 escuelas en Tailandia, lo que permite a más de 2.000.000 estudiantes el acceso a los materiales de aprendizaje en línea y aplicaciones basadas en IP. Se conectan a las LAN en las escuelas y el aprendizaje "cafés" y se centran en la entrega de matrial enseñanza. Este programa parece ser relativamente centralizado y muy específicas, sino que es un ejemplo de un proyecto de conectividad por satélite patrocinado por el gobierno.

Aquí está un breve vídeo IPSTAR en la educación y otras aplicaciones:

The CJEU's Innoweb dedicated meta search judgment in 15 tweets

Full CJEU judgment here

And the operative part of the CJEU judgment:

"Article 7(1) of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases must be interpreted as meaning that an operator who makes available on the Internet a dedicated meta search engine such as that at issue in the main proceedings re-utilises the whole or a substantial part of the contents of a database protected under Article 7, where that dedicated meta engine:

 

–        provides the end user with a search form which essentially offers the same range of functionality as the search form on the database site;

 

–        ‘translates’ queries from end users into the search engine for the database site ‘in real time’, so that all the information on that database is searched through; and

 

–        presents the results to the end user using the format of its website, grouping duplications together into a single block item but in an order that reflects criteria comparable to those used by the search engine of the database site concerned for presenting results."

Vargas Llosa review of "Now I Know Who My Comrades Are: Voices from the Internet Underground"

Mario Vargas Llosa, an important Peruvian novelist who began as a liberal and later ran as a conservative candidate for president, has written a review of the forthcoming (February 18) book "Now I Know Who My Comrades Are: Voices from the Internet Underground," by Emily Parker, a former journalist at the Wall Street Journal and New York Times.

The book reviews the role of the Internet and social media revolutions in China, Cuba and Russia, and Vargas Llosa says:

If Parker’s testimony is accurate, and I believe it is, China is the country, of the three here profiled, where the digital revolution has produced the biggest changes and seemingly unstoppable momentum. Cuba, for its part, is the one where the changes have been the least significant and most vulnerable to reversal.

The title of this book reminds me of the first example of politically oriented citizen journalism that I know of -- the use of Usenet during the Soviet coup attempt of 1991. The Net was used to bring information into and out of Russia and to spread information within Russia. One could read statements like this from Nizhniy Novgorod:

Yesterday at 17:00 a rally in support of Yeltsin was held; regional deputies participated. Today at 17:00 hours there will be a rally in the city center where a strike committee will be formed ... The atmosphere is calm in the city, there are no troops to be seen.

or this from Kiev:

It is relatively quite in Kiev as it all seems like a silly joke from here. On top of this, relevant information is not being supplied on the TV. I was on the central square at 12:30. A group of about 100 people was discussing the news.

China and Cuba made their decisions with respect to control of the Internet in the mid 1990s -- the Chinese opted for a widespread, controlled Internet and the Cubans, mindful of the fall of the Soviet Union, opted to control the spread of and access to the Internet. Where would we be today if Cuba had followed the Chinese lead?

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Update 3/8/2014

Emily Parker was interviewed about her book at the New American Foundation:

Cyberlaw memes and themes for 2014

[Updated as at 20 December 2014]
Following my hard law roundup of legislation and pending court cases in the EU/UK pipeline, here are some rather more amorphous cyberlaw themes to look out for in 2014. This is the realm of soft law, inter-government negotiations, NGOs, lobbyists, op-ed writers, bloggers and policy wonks. I have also thrown in some concrete items that were too speculative to qualify for the hard law survey.

Nudging and bludgeoning You could describe the UK government’s campaign to persuade ISPs to introduce default content filters as a variety of nudging, the idea being that a householder subscriber has to make an active selection to disable the filter. Aside from the inevitable coarseness of the filters, if this is nudging it is nudging with sharp elbows. Like many nudging ideas, changing the behavioural environment of the end user requires the co-operation, voluntary or enforced, of an intermediary. Call it what you like – private-public partnership, co-regulation, nudging, bludgeoning, backdoor armtwisting – we can expect more of it in 2014. [Here is David Cameron claiming that internet companies will Agree to do More to Filter Extremist Material Online, though the details of the supposed agreement seem a mite fuzzy.]

Magic wand politics Mention of filtering leads on to magic wand politics: the collective delusion of the governing class that the Good Fairy of the Internet can wave her magic wand and cure whatever perceived internet ill is troubling the PM and his advisers today. Steel yourselves for more in 2014. [The Intelligence and Security Committee Report on the Lee Rigby murder. If only Facebook had waved its magic wand.]

Understanding the internet Ill-considered political interventions provoke wailing from geeky quarters that politicians don’t understand the internet. But is the problem a lack of technical knowledge, or is it a deeper failure to embrace the liberal values that we like to think are embodied in the internet? If they did understand the consequences of their actions how many politicians would care? Given what politicians have shown themselves already capable of, tremble for the day (unlikely to be in 2014) when they do understand the internet. [Clause 17 of the Counter Terrorism and Security Bill is about so-called IP address resolution. MPs can hardly be blamed for not understanding it when every government explanation adds to the confusion.]

The Internet Wild West It is impossible to debate behaviour on the internet without somebody painting a picture of the internet as a lawless Wild West and casting themselves in the role of Sheriff come to bring order to the chaos. No matter that the internet is beset with more laws than the offline world and that many of those impose stricter rules (often inappropriately so) than offline. It is depressingly safe to predict that the Wild West meme will continue to flourish in 2014. [Perhaps less of the Wild West than expected (examples here and here), but we did get 'the beautiful dream of the internet as a totally ungoverned space' from Sir Iain Lobban, shortly followed by another Wild West in the Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee here (11:28). Then almost at the end of the year we had this corker from President Obama (with "rules of the road" thrown in for good measure).] 

Doctorow’s Warning Two years ago Cory Doctorow identified "the coming war on general purpose computing". He worried about the future lobbyists who would ask:



"Can't you just make us a general-purpose computer that runs all the programs, except the ones that scare and anger us? Can't you just make us an Internet that transmits any message over any protocol between any two points, unless it upsets us?" The answer (see Magic Wand Politics) is ‘No’, but serious damage can be done in trying and failing. Doctorow again:
"Reality asserts itself. Like the nursery rhyme lady who swallows a spider to catch a fly, and has to swallow a bird to catch the spider, and a cat to catch the bird, so must these regulations, which have broad general appeal but are disastrous in their implementation. Each regulation begets a new one, aimed at shoring up its own failures." With each new round of regulation aimed at preventing wrongdoing, the greater the temptation to rectify the failure of the previous round by throwing a wider regulatory net over non-culpable actors engaged in general purpose activities. Site blocking injunctions against online intermediaries is an obvious example. Co-option of payment processors, advertising networks, domain name registrars and search engines is another, as would be action against VPN. 

These are not the only examples. Traditionally liability for wrongdoing has applied to doing, participating in and procuring wrongful acts, but stopped short of facilitating and enabling them. One reason for drawing that dividing line is that acts of facilitation and enablement are by their nature general purpose. As such, damnifying them always carries a high risk of damage to legitimate activity, whether present or future, known or unknown. There will in 2014 be continued pressure to extend all sorts of online liability and obligations to facilitation and enablement. [The amendment to the RIPA definition of 'telecommunications service' by the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) is a classic example.  It now includes "facilitating" the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of a telecommunication system.]  

At a deeper level, the concern about co-opting law-abiders, facilitators and enablers represents the difference between a society in which each is free to set and pursue his or her own goals and allocate their own resources accordingly, and one in which anyone can be conscripted into an online army and commanded to crusade against the government’s designated enemy of the day.

Doctorow’s Warning is as relevant at the start of 2014 as it was two years ago.

Technological neutrality. Everyone loves technological neutrality and will appeal to it in support of whatever legal or policy position they are advocating. Laws should obviously be technologically neutral, shouldn’t they? Not necessarily. In fact resort to technological neutrality is dangerous without understanding (a) which version of technological neutrality you are invoking (b) when it is safe or appropriate to deploy it and (c) when other principles (e.g. fundamental human rights) should outweigh it. These were my slides on the topic at the Society of Legal Scholars conference in September. A full paper is in the works. [Now published.]

The rise of PIPCU Launched on 12 September 2013 with £2.6m of taxpayer funding over two years from the Intellectual Property Office and a special focus on offences committed online, the activities of the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit, operated by the City of London Police, have perhaps so far attracted most attention in the pages of Torrentfreak.  With emphasis on preventative and deterrent action, including requesting suspensions from domain name registrars around the world, its activities will inevitably attract wider scrutiny. The Open Rights Group has requested a meeting with PIPCU to discuss its processes. Definitely one to watch in 2014. [PIPCU in the news already 11 Jan 2014.][As at 11 June 2014 PIPCU has suspended 2,359 .co.uk domains and achieved 19 website payment provision suspensions (IP Crime Highlight Report). It has also launched an unpublished Infringing Websites List to be shared with advertisers in an attempt to disrupt advertising revenue.][On 23 October 2014 the IP Minister announced that PIPCU would receive another £3 million government funding to take it through to 2017.  Meanwhile PIPCU has been putting replacement advertisements on infringing websites, including one making the at first sight curious claim that "Illegal Downloading is a Crime". Unauthorised downloading is of course a civil copyright infringement, but is not in itself a criminal offence under the UK Copyright Act. This is how PIPCU has explained it:

@cyberleagle Thanks Graham. Downloading falls within s.45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 if it encourages s.107 CDPA 1988 offences.
— City Police PIPCU (@CityPolicePIPCU) August 15, 2014

 So there you have it.]

Copyright wars The Piscean fishes swimming in opposite directions have nothing on the copyright wars. Historically there was pressure from rightsowner interests for stronger copyright, provoking largely reactive and patchy opposition. Now we can identify not just resistance to stronger copyright, but a coalescing agenda for digital copyright reform. In the UK the Hargreaves recommendations are going through. Ireland and Australia have completed significant reviews of copyright, with the Australian Law Reform Commission having recommended the adoption of a flexible fair use copyright exception and the Irish review a more limited version. Some EU MEPs have started to formulate an agenda for copyright reform. The courts have started to show interest in aligning digital copyright to its offline equivalent. The copyright wars will continue to be fought out in arenas such as TTIP. [The new European Commission has included copyright modernisation in its Work Programme for 2015. Expect a bloodbath.]

Blocking injunctions In my hard law piece I mentioned the pending CJEU reference in Constantin Films v UPC. In parallel there will almost certainly be more UK applications for blocking injunctions under S97A. In practice the court normally makes a determination on the basis of evidence and submissions from rightsowners alone - a less than ideal situation. Will 2014 be the year in which some public minded body tries to intervene in an application on a quasi-amicus basis? [Yes. The Open Rights Group obtained permission to intervene with written submissions in Cartier's application for a trade mark blocking injunction. The court adopted some of ORG's suggestions for further safeguards in the blocking order.] 

Privacy In a prediction at the end of 2012 for BNA I said that 2013 might be the year in which the privacy industry remembered that the state is more threatening than a cookie. And so it proved. But will we keep our eye on the ball? Will we let EU politicians turn PRISM, TEMPORA and Snowden into an excuse for an information trade war with the USA? Will they get away with suggesting that EU data protection laws have historically protected against surveillance by EU national governments? Or will we convince ourselves that it’s all the fault of US corporations for collecting data (as if Galileo should never have built a telescope)? We will find out in 2014. [No. Yes. Yes. Yes.]

See also: Internet Legal Developments to Look Out For in 2014